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within SXTLAOS. However, the gene
was not found in any of the proposed
hot spot regions. The possibility that
the trimethoprim resistance determi-
nant is located on the chromosome
outside the SXT element and cotrans-
fers with the SXT in an Hfr-like man-
ner cannot be ruled out (9). Therefore,
additional hot spot regions may exist
in SXT elements for insertion of
DNA; otherwise the trimethoprim
resistance gene is not encoded within
SXTLAOS.
The nucleotide sequence data
reported in this study will appear in
the DDBJ/EMBL/GenBank nucleo-
tide sequence databases with the
accession numbers AB185252 for the
hot spot sO43-traL and AB186353 for
the hot spot traA-sO54.
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Modeling the
Impact of
Pandemic Influenza
on Pacific Islands 
To the Editor: Many Pacific
Island countries and areas have been
severely impacted in influenza pan-
demics. The 1918 pandemic killed
substantial proportions of the total
population: Fiji ≈5.2%, Tonga ≈4.2%
to 8.4%, Guam ≈4.5%, Tahiti ≈10%,
and Western Samoa ≈19% to 22%
(1,2). Thirty-one influenza pandemics
have occurred since the first pandem-
ic in 1580 (3); another one is likely, if
not inevitable (4). The potential use of
influenza as a bioweapon is an addi-
tional concern (5). 
The scale of an influenza pandem-
ic may be projected on the basis of the
available historical data that have
been built into a computer model, e.g.,
FluAid (6). FluAid uses a determinis-
tic model to estimate the impact range
of an influenza pandemic in its first
wave. Given the lack of accessible
data for specific Pacific Island coun-
tries and areas, the default values used
in FluAid were used for the propor-
tion of the population in the high-risk
category for each age group, for the
death rates, hospitalizations, and ill-
ness requiring medical consultations.
Country-specific population data
were obtained from the Secretariat of
the Pacific Community, and hospital
bed data were obtained from the
World Health Organization (WHO)
(7,8). The FluAid model was supple-
mented by a model of an 8-week pan-
demic wave and modeling of hospital
bed capacity. Further methodologic
details are provided in the online
Appendix (available from htttp://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no02
/04-0951_app.htm).
The results indicate that at inci-
dence rates of 15% and 35%, pandem-
ic influenza would cause 650 and
1,530 deaths, respectively, giving
crude death rates of 22 to 52 per
100,000 (see the Table in the online
Appendix). Most deaths (83%) would
occur in the high-risk group, 60% of
whom would be 19–64 years of age,
and 22% would be ≥65 years of age.
Additionally, 3,540 to 8,250 persons
would be hospitalized, most of whom
(78%) would not have high-risk con-
ditions. Also, 241,000 to 563,000
medical consultations would occur.
Most (87%) consultations would be
for patients without high-risk condi-
tions (50% birth–18 years of age and
46% 19–64 years of age). 
In the peak week of the pandemic
(week 4), from 15% to 34% of all hos-
pital beds would be required for
patients with influenza (Table). The
upper end of impact on hospital beds
at  >40% would occur for Guam,LETTERS
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Northern
Mariana Islands, and Tonga.
Assuming all consultations required
doctors, 42 to 99 influenza consulta-
tions per doctor would be required
during the peak week (Table). The
upper end of impact on consultations
for individual Pacific Island countries
and areas would vary from 31 (New
Caledonia) to 524 (Vanuatu); Fiji,
Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
Tonga, and Vanuatu would have rates
>150 consultations per week.
The uncertainties associated with
pandemic influenza mean that any
modeling of its future impact is rela-
tively crude. For example, the new
strain may be particularly infectious,
virulent, or both. In contrast, the use
of international-level public health
interventions as recommended by
WHO (9) may prevent pandemic
influenza from reaching some Pacific
Island countries and areas or particu-
larly remote island groups. These
issues and other limitations with the
model are detailed in the online
Appendix.
Nevertheless, if the death rate is in
the range suggested by the model, this
outcome would make it the worst
internal demographic event since the
1918 influenza pandemic for many
Pacific Island countries and areas.
The lower death rate (albeit for a sin-
gle wave) is similar to the U.S. rates
for the 1957 influenza pandemic (22
per 100,000) and the 1968 influenza
pandemic (14 per 100,000) (10). The
upper end is considerably lower than
for the 1918 pandemic, which sug-
gests that the range indicated is rea-
sonably plausible. Although relatively
high, the death toll from pandemic
influenza would still be less than the
typical annual impact for some
Pacific Island countries and areas
from other infectious diseases
(including malaria and diarrheal dis-
eases) and from such fundamental
determinants of health status such as
poor sanitation, poor diet, and tobacco
use. 
The predicted range of hospitaliza-
tions attributable to pandemic influen-
za would likely overwhelm hospital
capacity in many of the Pacific Island
countries and areas. Rapid response at
the onset of the pandemic could
ensure efficacious use of hospital beds
and resources, e.g., cancel elective
procedures and early discharge to
community care. Other contingency
plans by hospitals could facilitate
lower hospital admission rates (e.g.,
strengthening the primary care
response). 
Planning and capacity building
could be provided by WHO, the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community,
and donor nations and agencies with
support for improving surveillance
and other preventive measures for
disease control (see the online
Appendix for details). A combination
of national capacity building with
international support will maximize
the capacity to respond to the next
influenza pandemic as well as other
potential communicable disease
threats.
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Mycotic Brain
Abscess Caused by
Opportunistic
Reptile Pathogen 
To the Editor: A 38-year-old,
HIV-seropositive Nigerian man
sought treatment with an 8-month his-
tory of severe parietal headache,
impaired memory, fatigue, paresthesia
of the left arm, and left-sided focal
seizures. He had no history of neuro-
logic disorders, including epilepsy.
On physical examination, the patient
appeared well, alert, and oriented,
with slurred speech. Evaluation of the
visual fields showed left homony-
mous hemianopsia. All other neuro-
logic assessments were unremarkable.
The patient had a blood pressure of
120/80, a pulse of 88 beats per
minute, and a body temperature of
37.3°C. Leukocyte count was
8,600/µL, total lymphocyte count was
1,981/µL, CD4+ cell count was
102/µL, and CD4/CD8 ratio was 0.07.
HIV RNA-load was <50 copies/mL;
all other laboratory parameters were
normal. The patient had received anti-
retroviral therapy (stavudine, lamivu-
dine, nevirapine) for 5 months before
admission, but no prophylaxis for
opportunistic infections. Magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain
disclosed 2 masses, 3.3 and 4.8 cm in
diameter, respectively (Figure A), and
signs of chronic sinusitis. Acomputed
tomographic chest scan showed infil-
tration of both lower segments with
multiple, small nodules (Figure B).
Blood cultures were repeatedly nega-
tive. A computer-guided needle-
aspiration of the brain lesions yielded
yellow-brown, creamy fluid in which
abundant septated fungal hyphae were
detected microscopically (Figure C).
Cytologic investigation was consis-
tent with a necrotic abscess. The
cycloheximide-resistant isolate was
strongly keratinolytic and identified
as a Chrysosporium  anamorph of
Nannizziopsis vriesii (1,2). High-dose
antimicrobial treatment with
voriconazole (200 mg twice daily,
subsequently reduced to 200 mg
daily) was added to the antiretroviral
(ritonavir, amprenavir, trizivir), anti-
convulsive, and adjuvant corticos-
teroid treatment. The isolate was
highly susceptible to voriconazole in
vitro (MIC, <16µg/mL [Etest, AB-
Biodisk Solna, Sweden]). Recovery
was complicated by a generalized
seizure and severe, acute psychosis
associated with rapid refilling of the 2
lesions with mycotic abscess fluid.
After re-aspiration, the patient’s psy-
chosis improved gradually, and no
further seizures occurred. When last
seen 4 months later, the patient was
healthy and without neurologic
deficits. His CD4+ cell count was
233/µL, HIV-load was <50
copies/mL, and a MRI scan of the
brain showed partial regression of the
2 brain lesions (Figure D). 
Chrysosporium  spp. are common
soil saprobes, occasionally isolated
from human skin. Invasive infection
is very rare in humans, and most were
observed in immunocompromised
patients, manifesting as osteomyelitis
(3,4) or diffuse vascular brain inva-
sion (5). Here, we report the first case
of brain abscesses by the
Chrysosporium  anamorph of N.
vriesii. This fungus has been associat-
ed with fatal mycosis in reptiles (6,7)
and cutaneous mycosis in chameleons
originating from Africa (2). 
In our patient, we were unable to
determine the portal of entry and the
sequence of fungal dissemination; no
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